Example Of David Hull Essay

Introduction

David Hull has established new standards for close connection between science and the philosophers of science. He has demonstrated that philosophical study of science can be initiated into the actual development of science as contestable and important commentary. In Hull’s search for comprehending the scientific procesapiess, he has embarked on an intensely naturalistic course. He has also avoided a prescriptive epistemology and a descriptive approach that lacks any general insight into the world of scientific knowledge. In both these accounts, Hull’s work has the view of, if not a science of science; it should be a natural philosophy. Hull’s most direct and vital contribution to these debates has been to dispute that the ideas of human nature sit very uneasily in a Darwinian world. Hull stated that human nature is a blank philosophical notion. He claimed that the human nature notion is suspicious. Hull explains that among the centre of phenotypes allegedly constituting the fundamental nature of humanity, several are evolutionary homologies, and a number are not universally dispersed among the human population, and all are contingent and changeable evolutionary outcomes (Hull 3). Therefore, by removing all phenotypes kinds from the set that make up the core, the latter would become insignificant, perhaps constituting only uninteresting generalizations. I support the existence of human nature. By so doing I critique Hull’s views on human nature.
Presently, there is an important discrepancy in scholarly opinion as whether or not existence of human nature is real. In this essay, I support the existence of human nature. By so doing I critique Hull’s views on human nature. I also argue that accuracy on the issue of human nature is significant with respect to collective and individual problem solving. I support the fact that biological systems are present at multiple organizations level and relative to developmental stages, varying ecological, orientation viable systems, and frames of reference. Therefore, Human nature is not something that projects out and inheres from the organism; instead, human nature exists and diffuses at simultaneous levels of biological organization. It is at the intersection of epigenetic and genetic factors, present and past, and pragmatism and scientific truth.

Hull’s Perspective on Human Nature

Hull stated that if species are what largely evolve throughout the process of natural selection, then both phenotypic and genetic variability are important to biological species (Hull 4). If all species are unpredictable, then Homo sapiens should be variable (Hull 4). Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the human species, which is ranked as a biological species, can possess a set of invariable traits. It could be that during this period in evolutionary history, all human beings have a unimodal cluster or a particular set of traits. However, if this were the case it would be in a significant part an evolutionary accident. Therefore, any person who has to base anything inclusive of ethics and human nature is basing it on historical accident. Hull’s opposition to the thought of a universal human nature is closely linked to his great contribution to contemporary metaphysics. During the 1970’s language, philosophers were still citing biological species as examples of ‘natural kinds’. This entailed categories of all whose members had some similar fundamental essential property that contributes to what they are (Sartre 21).
I resist Hull’s perspective on human nature by proposing a nomological conception. Human nature is made up of properties that human possess due to the evolutionary process. Consistently with the argument of Hull, I accept that such properties are not seen all humans but majority of humans. I also acknowledge that such properties, in evolutionary time, are not permanent. This idea aims at identifying the similarities among humans by offering an option to the sciences that study and emphasize human phenotypic diversity. This contribution is significant as it highlights the implicit result of Hull’s analysis, which is, indisputable scientific problem does not analyze whether humans have attributes in common or not, but rather if this something in common is of a scientific interest. The important issue is whether the generalizations offered by the acknowledged science of human nature will be of any scientific interest (Darwin 29). Moreover, this remains an open experiential question as it depends on how scientists handle human phenotypic variation.
According to Hull species after Darwin, historical entities are defined by their lineage (Darwin 56). This idea is well demonstrated by the comparison between chemical elements and biological kinds. For example, If all atoms possessing the atomic number 79 were to one day disappear from earth, then the planet would lack any metal that could be referred to as gold. This would be a catastrophe for the jewellers and not trade; however, the need would be irreversible. Conversely, it would be metaphysically possible for the existence of gold to remain, as atoms with the appropriate atomic number would accidentally reappear. Therefore, gold could totally disappear and reappear on the earth centuries later. However, this is not the case with human and biological kinds as they are defined according to their lineage. Therefore, as a result of random rearrangement of atoms, entities rapidly spring into the existences that possess all the genotypical and pheno features of pterodactyls. Additionally, they would not still be pterodactyls, as they would lack the suitable causal history. Similarly, it is not possible to formulate androids that have all the characteristic human psychological and physical features that are identical to humans. This is because they would be involved in human nature in this first biological sense because they would not have the appropriate or right lineage.
The claim of Hull that there is no human nature sounds absurd. However, it is the result of insisting on traditional conditions for the understanding of concepts. However, since scholars are not tied to a narrow perception of conceptual conditions, there is an option of either rejecting or accepting their assertion. Hull insists that there is no such idea as human nature, biologically the conditions of the species hood are a matter of sufficient and necessary conditions furnished by genotypical or pheno non-relational properties. The concept of human nature that needs such narrow conditions can be referred to as HNI. However, allowing relation in specific historical properties can with no problems select human nature in the sense of species hood conditions (HNI). In naming the significant conditions there is a need to select a specific section of the phylogenetic tree.It is supposed to be clear that in order to characterize specific kinds of animals in a such a way there is need to be able differentiate the entities that complete the specieshood conditions. It is important that human, as animals meet the conditions of HNI, of whom this specific life form is expected.
In his article on the Human Nature, Hull argues that from the lack of what has been labelled above as HN1. He states that there is no aspect that could possibly fulfil the traditional roles of human nature. He also insists that there no feature and property which makes humans peculiar. Despite what I view to be a perfectly reasonable argument about Darwin’s condition of species hood, what Hull concludes from it is completely misleading. This is because he analyses the peculiar human as unusually ambiguous. Hull also seems to be repeating the biological argument. For Hull to understand and insist that there is no particular property that makes human peculiarly is basically the claim that there are no non-relational and timeless properties that have to be offered if a particular entity will be a human entity. I also think that the traditional role of human nature fails to be classificatory. Additionally, when something is being stated, or when someone perhaps a psychologist or a politician states that some feature belongs to human nature. This demonstrates that the biological argument should have purchase on such claims.

Conclusion

This article has supported the existence of human nature and it has critiqued opposing views on human nature such as Hull’s perspective. Hull states that there is no such concept as human nature. He insists that there is no perspective that could possibly meet the traditional roles of human nature. Hull also states that there is no trait that makes human peculiar. It has also given a partial explanation on why divergence of expert opinion could possibly exist. It has demonstrated that the problem of human nature is important in line with collective and individual problem solving. The essay has also supported that biological systems exist at a number of organizational level and relative to orientation viable systems, developmental stages, and frames of reference.

Works Cited

Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species. New York: Mundus Publishing, 2006. Print.
Hull, David L. "On human nature." PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meeting of the
philosophy of science association. Philosophy of Science Association, 1986. Print
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism is a Humanism. Yale University Press, 2007.