Example Of Mumbai Attacks And The Role Of Intelligence Case Study

The Mumbai attack was carried out on November 26, 2008 as a series of attacks on residents and visitors including Taj Hotel in a number of areas of the Mumbai the biggest and most important city in India. According to Intelligence report, it was planned by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) a terrorist Organization banned in Pakistan. India had received proof of the Association of Pakistan's (ISI) to classify terrorist attacks on Mumbai, which wasreported by different Indian television channels citing government sources. Indian Intelligence was warned by unconfirmed reports from the US intelligence services who already knew about the large-scale terrorist attack in India (Roy, et al., 2011). It was the evening of November 26, 2008, when around ten armed terrorists with machine guns and grenades carried out a series of attacks on residents and visitors in a number of areas of the city. Those terrorists entered the two hotels and took hostages in a building nearby; however, operation to destroy the terrorists lasted for more than two days. The victims of the terrorist attacks wererecorded by 174 people, and more than 100 people injured (Agrawal & Rao, 2011).
The Indian governments even knew the names of the instructors, as well as the location of terrorist training camps for that bloody action, which killed more than 170 people (Agrawal & Rao, 2011). The United States also had intelligence reports about terrorist training, and some of that information wastransmitted to the Indian Intelligence agencies, which directly related to the beginning pointed to the attack and terrorists' involvement in the attack. According to Indian investigators, based on interrogation of a single detainee who was arrested alive; the terrorist group arrived in India by sea from Karachi and he confessed that all the members of that group were trained in Pakistan (Roy, et al., 2011).
This news of terrorist attacks caused profound shock that claimed nearly two hundred lives in Mumbai, which is a city that wanted and had the potential to become one of the largest financial centers in the world (Kolås, 2010). Mumbai terrorist attacks stunned, dealt a devastating blow to the spirit and confidence of citizens, and it may have caused the metropolis wound that would not heal for a long time. Bombay was an important business center of world trade for centuries. Now it may take decades to restore the confidence of investors seeking safe harbor and a sense of security (Roy, et al., 2011).
Attacks on the Taj Hotel including the railway station, and other places of mass gathering of citizens with cumbersome and small arms units werecarefullyplanned large-scale military operation. The ongoing wave of organized violence was a need, but at the same time allowed the intelligence to take firm action to address the problem (Agrawal & Rao, 2011). The government had prepared a number of legal measures, including the establishment of the Federal Agency for the fight against terrorism, coordinating the actions of the anti-terrorist services National Guard Security (PNC), the police, intelligence services, Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force and Ministry of Civil Aviation (Kolås, 2010). The opposition opposed restrictions of civil liberties caused by anti-terrorist legislation, not able to stop the terror, but also causing enormous damage to opposition movements and political forces.
Carefully prepared campaign landed from the sea militants was unexpected and bloody. After the explosions in nine districts of Bombay, several groups simultaneously attacked on a number of sites, including the central railway station, also the center Sky train, hospital and police headquarters, Taj Mahal hotel, owned by India's largest financial and industrial group Tata, and the Oberoi hotel; however, in this case, the destruction of hotels was not planned (Carter, 2009). According to official figures, ten people participated in the attack, but there is reason to believe that well-armed and trained terrorists were about fifty, including women (Agrawal & Rao, 2011).
Meanwhile, Indian security agencies that have enormous experience in dealing with armed violence had been warned about the likelihood of an attack on Mumbai. Indian intelligence agencies informed the leadership of the country about a possible terrorist attack. October 19 supreme religious and political leader of the movement for the liberation of Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Agrawal & Rao, 2011). The Indian policy in Jammu and Kashmir is against Pakistan, irrigation construction estimating program in the state as to deprive Pakistan of water resources, threatened its agriculture. Water problem in this region from the beginning of the century was a strategic, defining life of nations and civilizations.
The British intelligence agency since September 2008 was monitoring the Zarrar Shah activities known as the communication and technology chief of the Lashkar; even the Indians were also monitoring the shah's digital networks and activities (Kolås, 2010). The analyst were trying to find out that who is responsible for the attacks and they were attempting to assess the learned lesson from and on the basis of which to stop such types of disasters in the United States as the various groups threatened them.
Since 2002, the Indian secret services received information that the Kashmiri insurgents conducted training operations near the Mangla Dam between Pakistani Kashmir and Punjab. It became apparent that experience difficulties in crossing the line of control guarded carefully between Pakistan and India separatists began to look for new ways to penetrate the Indian Ocean, allowing to strike the coasts of India. Indian Ministry of Home Affairs to respond appropriately has beenprovided for 73 areas of the coastal police (Kolås, 2010). However, these measures were not enough. Moreover, a week before the attack just from the field of ​​the attack were withdrawn previously placed their additional police forces under the pretext of a more rational distribution of the security forces.
Indian security forces (National Security Guards) launched an operation to free the hostages, "Black Tornado", which lasted until 29 November; however, until the end of this operation, 195 people werekilled, and 293 wereinjured. The forces involved in the operation were National Guard Security (NSG), hundreds of army commandos and Special Forces from several dozen of units’ of naval commandos MARCOS (Carter, 2009).
The main attack wasmade in the southern part of the city. Militants attacked the nine places: railway station, the hotel "Taj Mahal Palace", "Oberoi Trident" Kama Hospital, Nariman House (center lyubavecheskih Hasidim), Leopold Cafe, Metro Cinema, and College of St. Javier. Explosions also occurred in the city's port, the docks Mazagaon. In the suburb of Ville Parle, an explosion took place in a taxi. In buildings, gunmen opened fire and took hostages (Carter, 2009). By 28 November, the police and security forces released all buildings other than the hotel “Taj Mahal”. The hotel waspublished on 29 November. The terrorists arrived in Mumbai from Karachi on boats on November 26 when the two inflatable boats with a group of Urdu-speaking men sailed to the island of Colaba (Mumbai), their local fishermen noticed and reported this to the police, but they did not give much importance to this information (Roy, et al., 2011).
They opened fire with an AK-47, killing at least ten people. The hotel "Taj Mahal" two terrorists opened fire first and then took hostages, including tourists from Western countries. In the "Taj Mahal" then there were six explosions (In the "Taj Mahal" at that moment stopped members of the European Parliament delegation for international trade) (Agrawal & Rao, 2011). On the first day of the operation killed the chief of anti-terrorist police department Hemant Karkare, during the storming of the hospital "Kama". After two days of bombings and shootings, buildings were released. The latest published "Taj Mahal" on 29 November. All buildings suffered greatly (Agrawal & Rao, 2011).
After the attacks on Mumbai, the US, the UN Security Council, and then Pakistan had recognized "Jamaat ut-Dawa" terrorist organization, they froze all accounts, the Pakistani authorities have promised to close all its offices in the country. Then in Lahore under house arrest for three months took the founder of "Lashkar-e-Toiba" Hafiz Mohammed Said, who denied any involvement in the attacks, arguing that only leads preaching. In addition to Muhammad Saeed, the UN Security Council recognized three other leaders of LeT terrorists: this is its operational head Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi (arrested), Haji Muhammad Ashraf (Haji Muhammad Ashraf), Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahazik (Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq). They froze the bank's assets, banned from traveling abroad (Agrawal & Rao, 2011). Responsibility for the attacks took over a previously unknown organization "Deccan Mujahideen", although the Indian police described as "Lashkar-e-Toiba" as the organizer immediately after questioning the sole captured terrorist alive: Ajmal Kasab claims that he trained in LeT camps in Pakistan. Nevertheless, "Lashkar-e-Toiba" denies any involvement in the attack on Mumbai (Carter, 2009).
Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI had provided information about India terrorist attack on Mumbai hotel. India had transferred its 52 pages of materials (the investigation of terrorist attacks in Mumbai) CIA. India gave the ISI (Indian side) review and joint information. All of this wassent to India. Prior to the official statements of Pakistan refused to recognize its citizen Kasab caught up in a terrorist attack on the city on November 26 and demanded evidence from India. India, in , not to a of terrorist Pakistan until Islamabad not of their in (Carter, 2009). Information on the recognition of Kasaba Pakistani citizen came two days after India gave Pakistan the materials of the preliminary investigation. Dossier contains, among other things, reports of interrogations Kasaba (Carter, 2009).
Pakistani authorities handed over to the Interpol database information on the DNA of the alleged terrorists linked to the November terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, which killed more than a hundred people, Interpol said in a communiqué. According to the report, the data were obtained in the Lyon headquarters of the organization on March 21 (Kolås, 2010). The experts of the branch of Interpol immediately checked based on the description provided by the organization. According to the secretary general Ronald Noble organization, these data allowed Interpol to help Pakistan Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). Pakistan's decision to send the terrorist-related information on the DNA to all Members (organization) could help checking as a new stage in terrorism-related investigations conducted by Interpol (Agrawal & Rao, 2011).
In turn, the Indian intelligence agencies have to answer many questions. It is unclear how the police managed to miss any training in terrorist acts (unlikely terrorists laid dozens of kilograms of explosives in hotels "on the go", and about imminent terrorist attacks in Mumbai was known almost six months ago), nor the way to the city on several boats sailed, for a moment, a small army of gunmen. In addition, what steps need to be taken now to prevent this in the future? The great lesson learned from the attacks was the international partnership, and intelligence sharing is vital for avoiding such disasters. The Pakistani intelligence and law enforcement agencies helped and collaborated with Indian counterparts in the investigation process that strengthened the relations between India and Pakistan. According to the Director Mueller in his official visit to India and Pakistan admit that terrorist are not the enemies of only one nation but they are a common threat to the global peace and all the nations should make their efforts to combat the threat.

References

Carter, D.L. (2009) Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice
Kolås, Å. (2010). The 2008 Mumbai terror attacks: (re-)constructing Indian (counter-)terrorism. Critical on Terrorism.
Agrawal, M., & Rao, H. R. (2011). Information control and terrorism: Tracking the Mumbai terrorist attack through Twitter. Information Systems Frontiers, 13, 33–43.
Roy, N., Kapil, V., Subbarao, I., & Ashkenazi, I. (2011). Mass Casualty Response in the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks. Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness.