Free Haiti Essay Example

Introduction According to Baron, (2010), the earthquake that caused unpleasant condition of Haiti in 2010 was considered the most destructive disasters in the recent history that called for international humanitarian effort across the globe. This incidence occurred in a poor country that faced visible challenges of governance. Therefore, this paper seeks to investigate and determine how the Joint Task Force (JTF) Haiti and other international humanitarian effort were deployed and how they managed in executing its mission. It also highlights on how the JTF of Haiti coordinated the entire government approach in order to arrange significant actions establishing ways to carry out similar future mission would be improved, (Butterfield et al. 2010).Address and analyze: deployment of forces
According to Bhattacharjee et al. (2011) there is a formal implementation process that exists for examining the necessary requirements and deploying forces when called upon to provide significant humanitarian Assistant (HA) and disaster relief (DR) to support USAID and foreign agencies. When the formal request is timely received from the USAID, then support is ordered by Secretary of Defense. The concerned combatant command (COCOM) can send a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST) to the scene of the disaster to examine and evaluate the status and level of the support required. The HAST then will send a significant report for COCOM commander review, (Baron, 2010). If the commander approves, the COCOM will establish an order to subordinate forces and requests any necessary support that is needed from other organization or government agencies. However, in relation to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, that process of deployment was not considered at the beginning of the unified operation, (Butterfield et al. 2010).
According to Baron, (2010),because of the enormous size or nature of the disaster and the urgent need to voluntarily provide a vital assistance as soon as possible. There was no formal assistance that was rendered before forces were deployed in motion, (Bhattacharjee et al. 2011). Due to limited communications and inadequate information about the situation in the country “HAITI” following the earthquake. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and General Keen established verbal orders of commanding and deploying officers (VOCOs) to allow the requests for military forces to be accomplished more quickly, (Butterfield et al. 2010). General Keen then managed to make a phone call at the Ambassador Merten’s residence and after few minutes he linked with the U.S. embassy. For the purpose of initiating a series of telephone conferences with the general commanding departments, which had the abilities that he thought would be required. Keen managed to assess that the relief support will need a search and rescue team, equipment, medical personnel, and supplies and engineers. The General also assumed that the Haitian and responders would require vast supplies of water and food. The General decided to send the required capabilities and necessary resources to Haiti as quickly as possible, (Baron, 2010).The first groups that were assigned to joint task force (JTF)-Haiti were those which the department of defense had already commanded before SOUTHCOM initiated deployment unified response. Most of them were U.S. Navy vessels that included the Global response force (GRF) and aircraft carrier USS car Vinson, (Baron, 2010).
According to Butterfield et al. (2010), the joint task force (JTF) Haiti remained under the deployment and operation control of the SOUTHCOM commander throughout the deployment unified response. The JTF- Haiti also held administrative responsibility and tactical control of different subordinate units that was made up of high and reserve forces, (Baron, 2010). The first conduct of deployment unified response emerged into five significant phases for the U.S. military humanitarian Assistant (HA) and disaster relief (DR).
According to Butterfield et al. (2010), the first phase (initial response): this phase was characterized with the immediate life-saving, assessment and disaster planning. The second (relief): this phase started when forces were deployed to curb the human suffering in support of USAID effort. Authorities provide the first aid and disaster relief to assist the victim. This phase ended when the humanitarian requirements such as water and food were achieved. Third stage (restoration): this was initiated when the humanitarian needs were met and the major support shifts to reconstruction of major infrastructures such as roads, power, and communication, (Bhattacharjee et al. 2011).
In the same analysis by Baron, (2010), the fourth phase (stabilization)is reached when there is no legitimate and functioning civil governing body. The joint task force would require giving support to other U.S government. The sixth phase (recovery): this phase is typically featured by support to help civil governance in order to allow or enable civil authority.Conclusion
According to Butterfield et al. (2010), this humanitarian relief response was not only the answer to Haiti 2010 earthquake and the largest humanitarian Assistant (HA) and disaster relief (DR) deployment ever carried out by the U.S Army. This was one of the biggest international humanitarian operation responses to the natural disaster in the history of the whole world, (Bhattacharjee et al. 2011). In the analysis done by Baron, (2010), over 140 countries and 500 Non-governmental organizations contributed to the Haiti earthquake relief support. However, according to Butterfield et al. (2010) and Baron, (2010), the Joint Task Force. Haiti’s humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) helped to: synchronize, coordinate, track and assess HACC deployment operation. It created and maintained a humanitarian standard service and integrated with all stakeholders purposely to create considerable list of effort needed. It also served as the basis for JTF interface with NGOs, UN, and other interagency partners (deployment and operation unified response). JTF managed to save the life of Haitian people, (Butterfield et al. 2010).

References

Baron, K. (2010) After Haiti Earthquake. Call for More Military Disaster Planning, Stars and Stripes,.8(8), 432-442.Retrieved from: http://www.stripes.com/news/
Bhattacharjee, A. and Roberta L., (2011) Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake, New York: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January. Retrieved March 17, 2015.5(12), 766-773.
Butterfield, A., Ronaldo R. and Robert D. (2010), The United Nations Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord): Response to the Haiti Earthquake, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Retrieve March 17, 2015. Vol. 48(2), 256-271.