Overall Conclusions Report Sample

Introduction

The conflict in Syria has been lasting for more than 4 years becoming one of the most difficult-to-solve problems in the post-Cold War period. This complicacy is explained by its proper character and the fact of involving all the civil, ethnic and religious groups inside of the country as well as some influent regional actors.
This issue has never been a Syrian domestic problem, so long as it deeply affects humanitarian sphere. From the very beginning this fact made the international community focus on its solution. The EU position seems the most interesting due to its experience in solving the Balkan problem in the 1990s. Particularly I would like to focus on similarities between Kosovo and Syria, a comparison that it is hard to be avoided due to the same ethnic and religious background of the conflict.
In this context the model adopted by European Community, EULEX, will help us to clarify possible ways of Syrian conflict’s solution and decide, whether such a scenario is applicable to the current situation. Generally saying, this kind of mission is an ideal option for post-conflict period that actually is far from being achieved in Syria. I suppose that if all the contradictions between the five permanent members of the UN Security Council were overcame, it would be more logical to deploy UN blue helmets. However, EULEX model have proved itself in Kosovo, meanwhile international peacekeepers’ activity often does not resolve conflict but turns it into a frozen. So basing on all pros and cons, using EU experience in the Kosovo’s peace arrangement, my report is aimed at deciding, which scenario could be more efficient. I have no doubts that none of the European countries will assume such a risk, what make us appeal to the UN practice of two-stage solution: the peacekeeping is usually preceded by peace enforcement. It terms of Syrian conflict it means that until Assad is Syria’s President, there will not be any negotiations and no peace.
In spite of some fundamental similarities in these conflicts, I have to admit that the Syrian is much more complicated due to quantity of belligerent parties, regional and non-regional states directly involved in it that is the circumstance practically absent in the Kosovo’s bilateral conflict with a clear secessionist background. Also both conflicts cannot be considered internally, as they suppose direct threat the regional environment and have potential to extend farther. In spite of differences between the time and geographical context, the opposition is still the same – Russia and China that allows us to investigate it through global trends of the international system. The course of Syrian conflict makes very probable the future need of facing the problem that is steel not solved completely, regarding search an internal compromise between ex-belligerents and their return to a peaceful life (Greicevci 2011).
Considering all these facts I face the need to evaluate, to what extent the model of peace arrangement in Kosovo is applicable in the Syrian case and how much time it will take. Also I will suppose, whether its efficiency can approach to the grade reached in Kosovo till now.

Background and context

The conflict in Kosovo takes its beginning centuries ago, because this territory is considered sacred both to the Serbian who were obligated to leave it defeated in the Kosovo field battle in 1389, and the Albanians who consider it as an integral part of Grater Albania. After Tito’s death began the process of Yugoslavia’s dissolution that caused a huge rise of nationalism among the Albanians. In 1989, Serbia held a referendum that approved a new constitution that radically cut back the autonomy of national edges. In response to that started mass strikes, protests, ethnic clashes that led to declaration of the state of emergency .
Nevertheless, September 22, 1991 was proclaimed an independent Republic of Kosovo, followed by independence referendum and presidential elections. The new president, Ibrahim Rugova, started formation of armed groups of separatists, who in 1996 were integrated into the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Initially, the fight against the separatists, were only police units, but in 1998, the Yugoslav army replaced them (Biermann 2014).
The period of 1998 and the beginning of 1999 were the most sanguineous due to ethnic cleansings both by the Yugoslavian army and the KLA (Brocking 2013). The international community, led by the USA decided to interfere but the talks with the Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic were vain. Therefore it was attempted to adopt a UN resolution and proceed to the peace enforcement that was blocked by Russia (Tansey & Zaum 2009, p.15). Considering situation, the USA decided to act within collective institutions: NATO allies initiated the large-scale military operation "Allied Force", which lasted from March 24 to July 10, 1999, ended only after signature by the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) army and NATO military-technical agreement on the withdrawal of troops and Yugoslavia police from Kosovo and deployment of international forces to Kosovo. Post factum the UN Security Council adopted the resolution number 1244, which authorized the deployment, granting its members the status of military peacekeepers. In fast this resolution legitimated Yugoslavia’s disintegration, converting Kosovo in a certain international protectorate.
Cessation of hostilities in Kosovo was the launch of the NATO peacekeeping operation "Joint Guardian", in which participated near 40 thousand soldiers from 36 countries NATO members and its partners. As an official reason for international peacekeeping operations served the UN Security Council resolution №1199, allowing deployment of international contingent, KFOR ("Kosovo Force"), in order to separate opposing sides.
Nevertheless, in 2007 the Special Representative of General secretary Marti Ahtissari set an idea of sovereignization of Kosovo. Denying the possibility of Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia, M. Ahtissari stressed that the main guarantee of its implementation plan should be an international civil and military presence with strong powers in areas such as public relations, human rights, decentralization, protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the provision of law. Basing on this February 17, 2008 it was proclaimed Kosovo’s independence, recognized by 108 states in 2014. “Kosovo drew tacit support from Washington and several European donors for its independence declaration. In the declaration itself, the Assembly of Kosovo pledges to implement Ahtisaari’s plan in full” (Tansey 2009, p.159).Protests of the Syrian opposition began in late February 2011, under the slogan of change of the constitution and the abolition of the one-party system in which power is vested in the party "Baas" led by President Bashar al-Assad. A month later, sounded demand of his resignation due to Alawite (religious current which Assad belongs to) dominance in leadership positions. To resist to government forces it was formed the Syrian Free Army, widely sponsored by the USA and Arab countries of the Persian Gulf.
The new round of conflict arose in August 2013, when a number of media reports about large-scale use of chemical weapons by Syrian forces in the outskirts of Damascus, where suffered about 1800 people (Hoxhaj 2013). The possible use of chemical weapons unleashed global discussion on the need of a military operation in Syria. The majority of NATO allies opposed to repeat the Kosovo scenario and bombard Syria, not because they backed up Assad, but because of fear of Islam terrorism. On the contrary, all BRICS countries (Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa) and Iran supported the government and like it has happened in 1999 Russia and China repitedly imposed veto on every attempt to adopt UNSC resolution on Syria.
As a result of that, the situation in Syria got worse due to rise of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). ISIL has its origins in the Kurdish rebel group, which was formed after the US invasion in Iraq in 2003, with the active participation of "Al-Qaeda". In 2006 these organizations joined together to form the "Islamic State of Iraq". Subsequently, the terrorists have joined the small Islamist groups. The number of armed militants in Syria LIH reaches over 6 thousand, and in Iraq - more than 10 thousand (Jones 2013, p.5). They are armed mostly with American weapons, stolen on Iraqi weapons depots, as well as weapons, sent to Syrian opposition by some countries, including Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and even the US (Chivers 2014).
Basing on the history of its conflict we should conclude, whether there are more differences or similarities between them. Only in this way we will be able to understand to what extent EULEX model is applicable in Syria.
As I said, both conflicts were based on deep religious contradictions, although in Kosovo we seen ethnic motives as well. Assad, like his father, governs the country where the vast majority of Muslims (more than 80% of population) are the Sunnis, meanwhile all the leaders are Alawites (an offshoot of the Shiite branch of Islam). In Kosovo the conflict was caused by hostility between Muslim Albanians in Kosovo and Christian Serbs. Moreover, it can be analyzed in two levels: in terms of local confrontation in Kosovo, as in the north, near the frontier with Serbia there is a numerous Serbian minority (near 10% of its population), and also in the national level, because Slobodan Milosevic carried out the politic of extreme Serbian nationalism within the Yugoslavian Federation.
Another thing in common is the factor of Islam radicalism: Assad appeals to the strong jihadism influence within anti governmental forces, trying to discredit them and deprive them from Western help. Milosevic was trying to play the terrorist card, exaggerating radical tendencies in the ranks of the Kosovars. Nevertheless, NATO’s support helped to prevent the Islam radicalism from striking roots in Kosovo, encouraging a peaceful coexistence with Christian minority. The lack of activity in Syrian direction caused rise of ISIL state that only aggravated an unstable situation not only in Syria, but also in neighboring Iraq (Jenkins 2014, p.11).
The two issues have gotten stuck within UN institutions due to unconstructive position held by Russia and China. These states are used to support Assad regime, in spite of international critique and sanctions in order to counterbalance US presence in the Middle East. However, in 1999 the solution was found in NATO’s air strikes, even without according UNSC resolution. In the current conflict the main players are abstaining from direct military solution and it is unlikely them to change their mind in a short-term perspective. The solution is seemed to be found in Saudi Arabia’s air strike and Turkey’s ground operation. By the way, Turkey’s factor is crucial due to its membership in NATO: if it is attacked by Syria, NATO’s headquarter in Washington will have got a legal pretext to pound Syria (Rowell 2015).
Although these conflicts are used to be compared by some scholars and especially by journalists, there are a lot of differences, which do not allow us to apply the same pattern in their solving. First of all, in Syria nothing is so clear to the West as it was in Kosovo. The ethnic cleanings definitely convinced them to interfere, meanwhile the Syrian opposition tries to give the same value to the fast of chemical weapons use. Of course, the majority of Western media consider Assad’s troops to be responsible for use of prohibited substances, it is not completely certain that the Syrian Free Army did not do the same thing. Syrian authorities accuse the opposition of it due to the old chemical factories which are located in the territory under their control. 
One of the factors that had determined NATO’ support to the Albanians was that the KLA was united and had very strong support from Kosovar Albanians who overwhelmingly populated a clearly-defined territory ” (Brocking 2013). Regarding the Syrian there are too many interests to be consider and there are no unity within the opposition. I will provide a Kurdish example. This nation is divided between 4 countries: Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria and they proclaimed the aim at unifying in a sovereign state. Although the Syrian Kurds are used to being oppressed by Baas regime, Assad could negotiate and granted them autonomy, turning them from enemy into at least neutral side. It is not clear what will happen if the opposition wind the war, will it be able to find a compromise with those who, in their opinion, are betrayers? 
Kosovo was more comfortable to the West because the intervention could be justified both by humanitarian motives and guarantee of the nation’s rights for the self-determination. The Syrians’ target, to displace Assad, seems less convincible as it supposes to be a breach of the international law and one of its fundamental principle of state’s absolute sovereignty within its proper borders. In Kosovo it was simpler to make Milosevic’s troops retreat, because they were acting on the hostile territory. And if anti-Assad forces take Damascus, how can we be sure that there will not be bloody redeem on his followers (Brocking 2013)?
Another trait that makes the Syrian conflict different from Kosovo case is the regional environment. After the Balkan wars the majority of the regional actors were occupied by post-war settlement, trying to lay down some foundations of further European integration, so they were trying to isolate themselves from neighbours’ problems. The influence of possible EU membership is crucial in the Balkans due to is has been seen both as rescue from the wars and very often as the only connecting idea in such differentiated societies. But the practice shows that in the majority of cases, it has no more then promises, “whereas the new Central and East European member states entered the EU 11 (2004) or 14 (2007) years after being offered membership, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro have not even started accession negotiations after 15 years” (Biermann 2014, p.10).
In fact, only two countries adopted a definite position towards the conflict: Macedonia that has its proper Albanian minority and Albania that served as a stronghold for the KLA. In the Syrian case it is easier to find a no interested regional country, as the majority of the actors perceive it both in religious dimension and in terms of projection of their own influence in the Middle East. However, last events with multilateral talks on Iran problem, give some hopes on the change of Teheran´s stance on helping Assad.
Probably the most important difference lies in geographical features of these conflicts. Firstly, Kosovo is the part of the European region that made NATO´s intervention well-grounded: potential extension of the conflict could affect directly or indirectly NATO and EU members; regarding Syria there is no firm explication of possible NATO’s or some of it members’ attacks (Greicevci 2011). As I said, there is no possibility to get UN sanction on military actions, so the one possible option is the Arab League that still doesn’t have a solid position on this issue. Secondly, the Syrian population even after 4 years of war and millions of refugees is still 10 times as large as the Kosovo’s, meanwhile the territory of Syria is approximately like 18 republics of Kosovo (Brocking 2013).

Analysis

As the Kosovo case has never been recognized as precedent to similar conflicts, it required a special solution (United Nations Security Council 2007). Basing on the Resolution 1244 to Kosovo was deployed United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) as a civil continuation of the Kosovo Force stationing. The UN mission was granted legislative and executive powers , required for temporal administration of the region. The objectives of the mission were to establish self-government in Kosovo, return refugees, rebuild infrastructure and promote the political process to determine Kosovo's status . The highest international officer was Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo (Friesendorf & Penksa 2008).
The consequence of the Kosovo’s independence was some reduction and refinement of the UN Mission’s functions. In November 2008, the UN Security Council approved the proposed by Ban Ki-moon the six-point plan, which involves placing the EU mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Under this plan, the EU mission gradually takes over the functions of the Protectorate, including control over key sectors of internal administration. The Albanian authorities insisted on EULEX to act on the basis of "Ahtisaari Plan" and the Constitution of Kosovo, recognizing its independence and sovereignty. Although it favored the peacekeeping process, there were a lot of institutional discrepancy between the UN and UE missions. It was difficult no to notice that “the troubled relationship between UNMIK and KFOR cast a shadow over the relationship between KFOR and EULEX, after the latter deployed to Kosovo in late 2008” (Friesendorf & Penksa 2008).
However, Serbia and Russia, which supported the Ban Ki-moon’s plan insisted on that the mandate of the mission was not related to the status of Kosovo as an independent state. Thus, the EU mission is formally acting under resolution 1244 until July 2016 and monitors the Albanian authorities, meanwhile the reduced UN mission is retaining responsibility for Serb enclaves that maintain some connection and obtain the assistance from the Serbian government.
In addition to the police forces of the United Nations in the province also is retained direct international military presence, carried out by the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Despite the declared intentions for its reduction, the military mission under NATO control performs overall stabilizing role and acts in contact with the International Civilian Representative.

Coming to the conclusions, it is worth saying that applicability of the EULEX model depends on development and course of the civil war in Syria. Due to all the pros and cons I think that the UELEX model must be considered as a future scenario of the peace arrangement in Syria. It is obvious that currently it is unreasonable to establish any police or civil international presence, similar to EULEX in Kosovo until the war is over. Another possible circumstance which can make international community deploy police or civilian mission in Syria is a necessity to ensure some status-quo and prevent a possible revenge upon the defeated party. However, there is no status-quo, as the hostilities keep going, and in the current terms, those forces will be nothing but the target both for the Assad`s army and for the opposition armed with heavy weapon. Moreover, there is no legitimate power even on the Eastern territories under control of the rebellions represented primarily by the ISIL.
I am completely sure that the priority №1is to overcome the differences between all the key players at global and regional level. Like it was in Kosovo, it´s almost impossible to persuade Russia and China to adopt at least neutral stance on this issue. If they do not agree, the UN peacekeepers option should be completely discarded and replaced by some regional solution. However, we should not be so focused on similarities between the two conflicts because the Syrian is rather more dangerous due to its extent and global terrorism threat. It involves a number of factors, such as Islam fundamentalism and terrorism, absent in Kosovo. Moreover, if in Kosovo we saw a firm intention of all the regional and non-regional states to solve the problem, the Syrian conflict, in exchange, is perceived as an additional way to impact the Middle East regional system. This makes me think that further peace arrangement is possible only putting the Syrian frontiers under a strict control in order to minimize any external impact.
All that I said allows me to state that EULEX is completely applicable to Syria. Nevertheless, in 2008 in Kosovo it became a great alternative to highly expensive UN mission, meanwhile now, taking into account geographical and demographical factors, I can hardly believe this kind of mission is able to cover all the territory and spheres.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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